People are usually born into their political communities, and only a minority of them become member of the given community by naturalisation. Sovereign states enjoy a great margin of appreciation in defining the rules of both birthright and acquired political membership. Most states employ some form of cultural affinity-based criteria relating to ethnic identity that differentiate between applicants that seek to acquire the nationality of the state. Indeed, such distinctions seem to be growing with the revival of ethnic and nationalist aspirations that Europe has witnessed for some years. We argue that human rights principles, first and foremost non-discrimination guarantees, should be taken seriously and effectively applied to these cases of naturalisation, and show what such a scrutiny entails. While the arguments presented here should apply more generally, special attention will be paid to events that primarily triggered the authors' interest, the case of Hungary.
Introduction
Various forms of citizenship, and its legal counterpart, nationality, define membership in legal and political communities, but also, by this very move, define the boundaries of these communities, making the individual and the collective aspects inseparable. Different levels of governments only make sense with these communities defined. Accordingly, it is a question of primary importance, who has the authority to define these boundaries and what the possible limitations are on this power. With the growing importance of international and supranational human rights guarantees (most importantly the EU and the Council of Europe), various bodies can set limit to national citizenship policies.
Traditionally, international law has seen nationality as belonging to the core of national sovereignty, the 'domaine réservé' of states, implying an almost complete freedom from external interference. Constraints apply only in cases where a state seeks international (legal) recognition of its relationship to an individual (above all diplomatic and consular protection), and even in such cases, the mere showing of an existing (genuine) connection seems to suffice. This requirement can be seen as a 'positive' element, defining when states can recognize someone as a national. It does not say anything about possible 'negative' limitations, where states might be obliged to recognize someone as a national, against their will. Here, human rights law presents a potential ground for interference with naturalisation policies.
First, the 'right to nationality' has been codified. I Yet, this works less as a practical constraint on state policies (as a clear individual claim obliging a particular state would) and more as a general obligation of states to work towards the elimination of statelessness.
Second, the non-discrimination principle should apply to all decisions that concern individual rights and obligations. As a relative principle, the non-discrimination principle can be placed between 'positive' and 'negative' limitations on state power, establishing constraints that potentially cut both ways: when states should refrain from granting citizenship and in cases where they ought to grant recognition. Human rights standards have changed the landscape of national citizenship policies. It used to be a general practice, e.g., to differentiate between men and women, in questions of citizenship, reinforcing the vulnerability of women in case of divorce. States with citizenship policies that discriminate
Who are the people?
'One day Japan grants equal voting rights to the citizen of Norway so that they can elect a small party of Norwegians to the Japanese Diet if they wish. Then the Diet by majority vote levies taxes on Norwegian oil and directs its transfer to Japanese refineries' (Dworkin 2011: 380) . This is the hypothetical example of the book of Ronald Dworkin's Justice for Hedgehogs, which among others deals with the traditional question: Who are the people? As Dworkin emphasizes, people want to be governed by people relatively like themselves, and it has been taken to justify many forms of tribalism and nationalism: of race, religion, language, and kinship. But there is no answer to the question on who the right people are. This is because the ideal of democracy already presupposes a political community. As a default nation-states exist and their boundaries are created and altered by geography, accidents of history, war or politics (Dworkin 2011: 381-382) . In most cases we have acquired the political membership by virtue of birthplace or 'pedigree', in other cases by naturalisation. But in both cases it is the state, which decides on the boundaries of the given community. States are allocating political membership at birth usually according to parentage (ius sanguinis) and territoriality (ius soli). Naturalisation is 'the final step in the process of acquiring citizenship after birth' (Shachar 2012 (Shachar : 1012 . In order to acquire postbirth membership in a desired country, the applicant must first reach its territory and establish lawful permanent residence (Shachar 2012 (Shachar : 1012 .
The paper accepts the Rawlsian claim that the nation-states are the primary loci of political legitimacy and the pursuit of justice and that the sovereignty of these states are constrained internally by the moral equality of individuals who are subjects of the given states, that is, who live in the territory of the given states (Rawls 1993: 36) . The government must treat all its citizens as equals in the sense that political decisions and arrangements must display equal concern for the fate of all. Becoming a member of a political community is a crucial factor in the determination of life chances. The fate and life of the citizens of a political community are interconnected. The state's basic political institutions elaborate the rules, which govern their life. Citizens pay taxes to cover the expenses of the political institutions, public services and the redistribution. As citizens we tend to give preference to each other's interests, and sometimes this 'preferential treatment' is justified. IV It is the principle of justice, which gives answer to the question whether the preferential treatment is acceptable or not in a given case.
Members of the political community are in different situations both in terms of their abilities and capacities, and their social background and economic conditions. It is the duty of the state to improve the social and economic position of disadvantaged groups so that their opportunities shall be more equal. The state measure does not mean privilege, or giving more rights, but state intervention in order to reduce the social support of negative discrimination and the differences leading to it. The purpose of these measures is the equation of group disadvantages, that is helping those who had in an unjust way got into a disadvantageous situation because of their belonging to a social group.
For instance, it is justified to employ preferential treatment if a social group cannot take part equally in the life of the political community, possibly but not necessarily because of structural discrimination, and if the inefficient political power of the group has become steady, because then the group exists separated, isolated from the political community.
Accordingly, the term preferential treatment is not the synonym of a justified classification and its goal is never to benefit certain persons. The ultimate purpose of preferential treatment, by definition, is the elimination of inequalities of opportunity in society.
However, in the case of rules conferring the status of citizenship the applicants are not yet stakeholders of the given political community. Following Rainer Bauböck, stakeholders of a country could be those individuals, whose ongoing ties to the polity involve them deeply in its present political life and 'whose circumstances of life link their future wellbeing to the flourishing of a particular polity ' (Bauböck 2007 ' (Bauböck : 2422 . They can have a claim to membership and to participate in collective decision-making processes.
What kind of standards should govern our relations to individuals applying for admission to our political community? Thomas Nagel offers universal human rights as the source of the constraints on the external exercise of sovereign state power (Nagel 2005: 136 should be a reflection of an actual relationship. This follows from the fact that nationality is a key element in defining the boundaries of the political community. Voting and candidacy are usually the privileges of nationals, and as rights they should be exercised by the right people. If political decision-making is seriously detached from stakeholders, this might end up putting the underlying political rights into risk. This is why we need standards to determine whether the extension of citizenry in a given case is morally right or wrong.
This standard could be equality, which has close connections with justice in general.
Building upon Rawls' conception of the resource-egalitarian theory of equality, this paper provides normative foundations for its main thesis that common non-discrimination guarantees should be applied to the case of naturalisation and cultural affinity-based preferences. 
Applying the non-discrimination test
Regardless of whether we assess impermissible discrimination in a domestic constitutional setting or on the international level, we can largely move along the twoprong test of necessity and proportionality. Reconstructing the test applied by the ECtHR, the steps look as follows: XV 1) whether there has been a difference in treatment between persons in similar situations;
2) whether there is objective and reasonable justification; 2a) whether it pursues a legitimate aim; 2b) whether there is a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised.
In the case of external ethnic citizenship policies, it will not be hard to establish that there is a difference in treatment: it is quite unique for states to grant citizenship to nonresident aliens, especially if this happens in large numbers. Distinctions based on ethnicity will be especially suspect for the Court: 'Where the difference in treatment is based on race, colour or ethnic origin, the notion of objective and reasonable justification must be interpreted as strictly as possible'. XVI Furthermore, in ECHR case law, rather than looking at mere intent or aim, the effect of the policy is enough to show that there is a difference in treatment ('indirect discrimination'). XVII This will render suspect the seemingly neutral policies that many European states prefer to adopt when furthering the goals of their external ethnic citizenship policies. E.g., Romania and Hungary both apply legal clauses that seek to circumvent earlier border changes, in an indirect way, instead of using a direct ethnic condition. The Romanian clause simply talks about those who lost their nationality 'for reasons not imputable to them' or 'against their will'; the Hungarian law talks about applicants 'whose ancestor was a Hungarian citizen, or whose Hungarian origin can be presumed'. XVIII As showing the unequal effect will suffice under ECHR case law, it is enough here to conclude that external ethnic citizenship policies, in their actual application, enforce an ethnic preference, and we do not need to go into the details of the legal wording 97 co-ethnics abroad, but also recognise this connection as in line with international law. The major problem with this view is that it would upset the delicate balance of established minority rights standards that maintain the primary responsibility of the home state in securing minority rights, and limit the kin-state's ability to interfere directly. XXIII A persistent defender could still object and argue that this might not be that bad, after all. It seems that we give an additional layer of protection for members of a potentially vulnerable
group. Yet, if we think of recent examples of Russian interventions that have been defended, among others, on grounds of 'protecting fellow Russians', it is easy to see how the first step of additional protection easily slips into a second one, contributing to an increased securitization of minority rights. This, in turn, is hardly beneficial for minorities who normally seek to fight the perception that they present an inherent danger (because they are potentially disloyal) to the state they live in. XXIV Not to mention the issue that external citizenship weakens minority claims for self-governance by increased autonomy (Bauböck 2007). In the Hungarian case, the rights of Hungarians who naturalise from Austria, Slovakia and Ukraine without taking up residency in Hungary actually diminish in important respects. As these countries do not allow applicants to maintain their original nationality, they become nationals of another country, with the additional layer of EU citizenship only available in two of the three cases.
In other words it is, at best, a fallacy to think that it is an external measure, nonresident naturalisation that can address the ills of minority life. XXV Getting back to our original question of justification, it remains questionable whether the ethnic link would be enough to defend external citizenship policies from criticism concerning their legal justifications.
2) State governments can apply a somewhat more refined version of the ethnic argument and could argue that granting citizenship is simply a form of recognition that had earlier been denied from co-ethnics residing abroad. They share their 'national identity' with the majority of the kin-state, it should only be permissible to acknowledge that with official documents, that can include a passport, attesting their 'national belonging', having their names printed on their mother tongue ('written as it should be'). Many of these claims are more than legitimate. The primary function of minority rights is exactly to secure that these claims (e.g., right to recognition, right to use one's name) are met --by the home state. The kin-state's ability is, for both legal and technical reasons, limited in this sense.
XXVI
We have seen earlier that external citizenship as a replacement or additional guarantee for minority rights contradicts some basic tenets of the present system. Furthermore, we have seen that nationality, according to the established legal view, is more than symbolism.
While states can adopt policies that counter this, they can hardly use this deviation to justify their policies against external (domestic or international) human rights review.
3) State governments can still point to patterns of oppressive policies, persistent violations in home states, against which they seek to grant protection, remedying existing discrimination. After all, refugee law and, more recently, the concept of the Responsibility to Protect both seem not only to legitimise but also require the protection of third states.
Yet, it is easy to see how the grounds of justification diverge in these cases. External protection is legitimate insofar as, in the individual case, it has been established that this is necessary: there has been a violation of human rights. We should not forget that in all of these cases, there is a national sovereignty argument on the other side, too (just like with the external citizenship policy of the kin-state): the home state could argue on similar grounds against external intervention in its relationship with its own resident citizen.
Furthermore, diplomatic and consular protection in the case of dual nationals is limited by the principle of effective nationality, which defeats the goal of extending citizenship so as to provide some kind of external protection.
So it seems that while states might be free to adopt policies on general (not individualised) arguments of discrimination by home states, these cannot stretch existing boundaries and go against the sovereignty of home states. Just like we have seen earlier with minority rights based arguments, a contrary position would question the current setup of the international minority rights regime.
4) State governments could point to actual discrimination flowing from past injustices.
In the Hungarian and Romanian case, the argument could go, former citizens were denied nationality. Hungary recognises descendants of its nationals as nationals, regardless of the number of generations, the ratio of Hungarian national ascendants, linguistic skills or, most importantly, residence. In contrast, this 'line of inheritance' is broken in the case of former nationals (and their descendants) that lost their Hungarian nationality as a result of the borders moving over their heads. As a direct result undoing this potentially expands the citizenry to 'Greater Hungary' and maybe beyond. Similarly, Romania grants nationality, through 'reacquisition', to former nationals that lived in 'Greater Romania'. XXVII ECHR case law recognizes and might even require the correction of 'factual inequalities'.
XXVIII
The fallacy in these arguments follows that in earlier justifications: governments try to legitimise their policies by contrasting them with policies that they adopted themselves.
Extending the citizenry through an indefinite line of generations, while permissible, hardly seems to be normatively justifiable. States might feel free to adopt such measures, but they can hardly use them as arguments to justify their otherwise questionable policies. space, a truly multicultural universe where national identities are freely recognized. The issue with this argument is that it seeks to slip through the part of the policy that is problematized in the first place by the non-discrimination standard. Rather than a truly European project of virtualizing borders, external ethnic citizenship policies draw new borders based on ethnic belonging. Contrary to the goal of justifying external citizenship policies, this argument is hardly more than a recognition of the goal of discrimination. The government that argues against homogenization in the home states ends up seeking the same type of internal homogeneity among its citizenry.
This will not render, however, all distinctions based on ethnicity (or 'cultural affinity') discriminatory. While we can ponder how far liberal constitutional regimes can go in seeking to maintain or establish some sort of internal homogeneity, in a legal assessment most of the resulting policies will pass the human rights tests commonly applied today, also considering that states will have some margin of appreciation.
Differentiation based on linguistic skills, familial connections, some degree of 'cultural knowledge set' (sought to be assessed in naturalisation tests) will most likely favour applicants who are closer, culturally, to the ideal citizen of the policy maker. Asking for a fee to start the procedure and the requirement of adequate resources (means of subsistence, trying to make sure that newly naturalised citizens will not be an undue burden on the welfare system) will disfavour the less wealthy. Yet, in themselves, these will most likely not constitute human rights violations, provided that the non-preferential To see why even this scenario is problematic, we need to move beyond the grounds of justification and move to a more demanding element to the test, proportionality.
Proportionality is a relational term that requires in this case a proportionate relationship between the legitimate policy goal and the means employed, that is, the grounds of classification. In cases when fundamental rights are not at stake and the classification applied is not suspect it is sufficient to apply the weaker test of reasonable goal. However, giving ethnic preference for non-residents, e.g., as a recognition of their 'national identity' automatically means a differentiation based upon an immutable characteristic (ethnicity).
Heightened scrutiny is appropriate, which requires a necessary relationship between classification and the compelling state goal, there should be no less discriminatory way to achieve the objective. Although to avoid underinclusivity (where all persons with the trait contribute to the harm but others do too) and overinclusivity (where all that contribute to the harm have the trait but some with the trait do not contribute) is important in every type of differentiation, it is even more crucial in cases of suspect classification. A substantially overinclusive or underinclusive classification tends to undercut the claim of the legislator that the classification serves legitimate political ends (Stone et al. 1996: 751) . Regardless of which justification we accept from the list that we have seen earlier, we will see both underinclusivity and overinclusivity. Ethno-cultural proximity will be only a crude predictor both for potential social integration and for how invested someone is in the political community (following the stakeholder concept), leaving people out who should qualify and, at the same time, including people who would not qualify. While governments routinely apply such loose standards, in the case of ethnic preference, such laxity might prove to be fatal, regarding the non-discrimination test. This, in turn, will also depend on what is at stake: what difference does it make to be in or out of the preferential group?
A substantial view should then consider not only the external citizenship policy, taken in isolation, but also its relationship to the non-preferential track of naturalisation. This is why it matters how 'open' non-preferential naturalisation is. If the ground for differentiation (ethno-cultural proximity, through legislative assumptions and the way it is assessed in practice) cannot justify the distance between the preferential and the nonpreferential track, the policy will fail the proportionality test and should be seen as discriminatory. XXIX In the Hungarian case, the non-preferential track includes a 3+8-year residency requirement (considering the registration of settlement in addition to the number of years required by the law directly applicable to naturalisations), while the ethnic preference gives full exemption from the condition of residency, allowing applicants to naturalise without having visited the country. Applicants relying on the ethnic preference have additional benefits like not being required to prove the means of subsistence and housing or to take the naturalisation test.
We argued that it is justified to take the non-discrimination principle seriously and apply the test to naturalisation policies, including external ethnic citizenship policies. Our analysis now concludes that once we take this route, it is hard to stop short of declaring such ethnic preference in violation of the non-discrimination principle, especially if access to citizenship for residents otherwise remains highly restrictive.
So far we have examined justifications that are the most likely to succeed on a nondiscrimination test. As these considerations show, however, what is really working in the background is a nation-building project that seeks to revisit history, to the extent possible (ie., without directly questioning existing state borders), and ('re-') establish a desired past through the means of citizenship policies. As the Hungarian case shows, these goals can go hand-in-hand with more direct political aims benefiting certain parties that seek to secure a loyal voting base with the extension of those eligible to vote, in which case justification under any human rights test is hardly an option.
Case study of Hungary

Legislative history
Our aim in this chapter is to have a deeper understanding of how direct political aims play into policy decisions and reasoning, an insight that should inform our judgment on the legitimacy of naturalisation norms.
The case study focuses on Transylvania, the region where most of those concerned by 
Implementing the new external citizenship policy
In what follows we seek to go deeper into the goals that the legislation actually serves with the extension of citizenship and voting rights. As justification constitutes an essential part of the non-discrimination test, here we provide some empirical insights into the functioning of the new policy, as it can be perceived by the target population. First, we evaluate the implementation of the measures concerning the extension of citizenship.
Second, we focus on the execution of measures concerning the extension of voting rights. The amalgamation of the three organisations frustrated the goals of the National
Council to support everyone regardless of their political views. The Democracy Centres failed to comply with their duties other than providing support connected to the naturalisation. They were meant to assist the applicants in submitting a naturalisation request, however, in practice, employees were filling out the complete application forms and book appointments at the Consulate, and sometimes they also helped to complete the handwritten CVs. This meant that the same employees had full control over the process, also being able to filter applicants. The official explanation was that the organisations representing Hungary beyond the borders were in position of investigating the applicant's Hungarian knowledge before submitting the application package to the Consulate. In reality, the process seems to be used to gain support for a political party in two respects.
First, by showing that the implementation of the law is in the hands of people connected to the People's Party that is close to the Hungarian ruling party but not supported by the majority of the Hungarian voters in Romania. Even if we accept that these employees can act in the name of the Hungarian state in such a way, the confusion of duties that we encountered puts into question the neutrality of the process that one could expect from a state procedure to accept new nationals. Second, by providing funds which in part were used for political campaigns in the Romanian elections. The network of the three organisations exercised state power extraterritorially and they worked under political influence coming from the Hungarian ruling party. All this seems to frustrate the goal of genuine reunification, and looks more like exporting political divisions from Hungary. As we have seen earlier by extending the citizenry one of the main aims of the Hungarian ruling party was exactly this: to cement its own power for a longer period. The idea to extend the citizenry beyond the state borders is not a new one; it actually marks a regional trend, a model that was certainly known before the Hungarian decision-makers. and/or did not register for voting. The quoted statement seems to push these people outside of the national community described as 'the whole nation'.
Conclusions
In this paper we argued that the general non-discrimination test should be applied to naturalisation policies, including external ethnic citizenship policies. Since classification based upon ethnicity is a suspect one, heightened scrutiny is required to filter out discriminative state measures. The relevant normative, human rights test examines whether the ethnic classification applied is proportionate to the legitimate aim. Therefore, the paper looked into possible goals (ethno-cultural ties as genuine link, nationality as an expression of 'national identity', oppressive policies of the home state, remedying discrimination flowing form the past, social integration, virtualising borders) the state can legitimately seek to achieve by implementing external ethnic citizenship policies. These are the possible justifications that are the most likely to succeed on a non-discrimination test. However, in addition to these prima facie acceptable justifications for external ethnic citizenship policies, illegitimate policy goals can be identified, which are not relevant for the non-discrimination test, as they would immediately fail the scrutiny. Often what is really working in the background is a nation-building project that seeks to revisit history, to the extent possible, and ('re-') establish a desired past through the means of citizenship policies. One of the main goals of the recent extension of citizenry and voting rights in Hungary was the 'reunification of the Hungarian nation'. However, Hungary's external citizenship regulation and its implementation did not help to create unity rather it caused divisiveness. The majority of trans-border ethnic Hungarians did not apply for Hungarian citizenship and/or did not register for voting. The applied policy and the implementation process seem to push these people outside of the national community described as the whole nation. All this seems to frustrate the goal of genuine reunification, and looks more like exporting political divisions from Hungary and seeking to secure a loyal voting base. 
